

IC 76-2331
25 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

25X1A FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: CIA Lebanese Evacuation Task Force

1. The following is a brief account of how the recent CIA Lebanese Evacuation Task Force functioned in the main. It is based on my discussions with the Chief of the Task Force, [REDACTED] and several of its members. 25X1A25

2. The Task Force, composed of representatives from OCI, OSR, OER, DDO, and the Operations Center, was in operation a little over 48 hours--from noon Friday, June 18 until about 1400 Sunday, June 20. During that time it issued a total of 7 Situation Reports--one about every eight hours. A hard copy version was prepared for the DCI and internal agency elements and was also LDXd to the White House Situation Room. A cable version (the same text) was sent at Immediate (sometimes Flash) precedence to consumers--including certain embassies and military commands--as well as the Intelligence Community.

3. The Task Force area is located directly under the CIA Operations Center which acts as the principal communications center for the Task Force. All crisis-related electrical and hard copy material received in the Ops Center is immediately tubed down to the Task Force. The Task Force has direct-line secure phone communications with the White House, the CIA Operations Center and other operations and intelligence centers in the Washington area.

4. No problems were encountered with the flow of intelligence information into the Task Force. Arrangements were made to have all crisis-related CIA/DDO reporting forwarded directly to the Task Force before being distributed to the DDO watch officer. Likewise, at the end of each shift, the CIA/DDO representative serving with the State Task Force Group was debriefed by the CIA Task Force before reporting to his parent element. A number of NOIWON conferences were initiated by the CIA Ops Center to circulate and obtain additional information on activities relating to the situation.

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5. Some difficulty was experienced in obtaining operational data. JCS Ops Orders were not addressed to CIA and attempts to correct the problem, despite assurances from NMCC, were not successful. Consequently, when the Ops Orders were received at State the DDO representative there had to resend them to the Task Force. The DDO representative at State also frequently phoned EXDIS/NODIS information into the Task Force but there was apparently some delay in the actual delivery of this material to CIA.

6. Mr. Bush participated personally in the Task Force's operations from 0200 to 0500 on Sunday, 20 June. He maintained frequent phone contact with State, Defense and White House officials and kept the Task Force informed of political and operational actions and decisions. Later, Mr. Kissinger called to thank CIA for "its assistance and fine spirit of cooperation."

7. Vince Heyman, Chief of the CIA Operations Center, is preparing a detailed report on the Task Force's operation and will provide a copy to the IC Staff.



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① 1 July 1976

NOTE FOR: ②

FROM :

SUBJECT : CIA Lebanese Evacuation Task Force

I have sent forward your fine memorandum on the Lebanese evacuation task force experience with the observation that, while a "success story," this kind of approach really is no substitute for the National Situation Report task force this staff has been proposing.

It looks as though Lebanon has been the only crisis so far in which DCI Bush has played a significant role. You note his participation in the task force on 20 June. He was also, from time to time, in the White House in direct consultation with the President, as the newspaper record indicates.

I would like to attempt pulling together a brief description of the role the DCI did play, when and where he did what -- especially in direct consultation with the President. This could be a significant aspect in our general review of the DCI's crisis role.

I will see if I can not get you hooked up with [REDACTED] on this.

INFORMATION

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO:

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

Bush -- I doubt if
much will come of para.
3+4. I spoke
to [redacted] and he
allows that there is no
record of Bush's action.
Something would have to
come from Bush himself.
There is one point worth
noting: Bush is disappointed
on the delay in getting
started on a Task Force.

FROM:

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION